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Microanalysis as ideology critique: the critical potential of 






Microanalysis – understood as the ‘zooming in’ on the details of everday social practices and 
situations – is an increasingly popular tool of academic study in the discipline of International 
Relations (IR) and beyond. However, the critical potential of so-called micro-moves is today 
largely ignored. This chapter seeks to revive this potential. It elaborates four different 
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In recent years, microanalyses have gained increasing traction in the discipline of 
International Relations (IR) and in political science more generally. This popularity is 
reflected in a wealth of different theoretical approaches and labels, ranging from practice 
theory (Adler and Pouliot 2011) to relationalism (McCourt 2016), from ‘micro-moves’ 
(Solomon and Steele 2017) to ‘micro-politics’ (Chakravarty 2013), from political 
ethnography (Neumann 2012) to ‘performances of agency’ (Braun et al. 2019). The turn to 
microanalyses is commonly associated with two distinct promises (cf. Esguerra et al. 2017, 
16). On the one hand, microanalyses are seen as complementary of grand theory, 
substantiating macro-theoretical claims and enabling exchange among different grand 
theories (Adler and Pouliot 2011). On the other hand, microanalyses are often cast as a (more 
or less radical) alternative to macroanalyses, bringing to the fore that which is ignored by 
grand theory – that which ‘escapes, overflows and exceeds’ macro-theoretical assumptions 
(Solomon and Steele 2017, 270). Yet while these two purposes – complement and alternative 
– seem to exhaust the possible uses of microanalyses, there is a third purpose that is less often 
acknowledged. This purpose is, in short, ideology critique – the critique of extant theory as 
ideology. 
 
The critical potential of ‘zooming in’ on everyday social practices is today largely ignored. 
This observation is particularly obvious for what is arguably the largest and most prominent 
field of microanalysis in IR today, namely practice theory. Originally the case for studying 
practices was associated precisely with the purpose of studying theory in a critical manner (cf. 
Wille 2018). Consider the article by Iver Neumann that is widely heralded for introducing 
practice theory in IR: Neumann (2002) explicitly linked the turn to practices to an earlier 
critical literature in IR championed by scholars such as R.B.J. Walker (1993), Richard Ashley 
(1987) and Robert Cox (1981). Cox had argued that one important purpose of critical study 
was the examination of how ‘problem-solving theory’ was enmeshed in the reproduction of 
social order (Cox 1981, 128), and Walker famously claimed that IR theory was indeed more 
interesting as an object of explanation rather than for what it explained. The main point of 
Neumann’s intervention had been that a focus on the details of everyday politics was able to 
make a crucial contribution to this critical project. By zooming in on ‘how politics is actually 
effected’, we would gain, Neumann argued, a better understanding of ‘how our own analyses 
of international relations may preserve a certain state of affairs’ (Neumann 2002, 627, 638). 
However, in current debates, practice theory is no longer associated with this endeavor, and is 
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instead framed – indeed also by Neumann himself – as an analytical rather than critical 
project (see for instance Adler and Pouliot 2011; Neumann and Pouliot 2011; critically, see 
Schindler and Wille 2019). This makes not only practice theory, but also other so-called 
micro-moves vulnerable to objections by theorists that have either claimed the research 
programme lacks theoretical specification (cf. Ringmar 2014) or are concerned that attention 
to the small and contingent comes at the price of losing sight of the nature of social 
domination (Koddenbrock 2015; Schmid 2018). 
 
With this chapter, I seek to resuscitate the promise Neumann recognized in the move to 
studying the small and seemingly irrelevant details of everyday politics. I want to 
demonstrate that microanalyses are able to deliver a profound understanding of how precisely 
theory is practical and political. The ‘zooming in’ on the details of everyday practices can 
make obvious that specific theories reflect just one perspective among many. They can help 
us gain what Robert Cox termed a ‘perspective on perspectives’ (1981, 128). A case in point 
that substantiates this claim can be found precisely in Neumann’s early intervention on 
practice theory (2002). Neumann’s study concretely showed that IR theories were premised 
on a questionable notion of the international system, since this notion made IR theorists blind 
for ‘the key drama of present-day global politics’, namely ‘to what extent state actors 
increasingly have to grapple with other actors in or even outside the system of states’ (2002, 
639). In an in-depth examination of how sub-state actors in the border region between Russia 
and Norway tried to establish cross-boundary cooperation, Neumann showed how the 
Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs attempted to police the boundaries of the international 
state system, trying to prevent the sub-state actors from acting on their own. Zooming in on a 
seemingly unimportant struggle over who got to have a say in the construction of inter-
regional cooperation, Neumann revealed that the larger question of who could claim to be a 
legitimate actor in the international system could not be defined on the level of theory but 
instead was deeply political. Struggles such as the one Neumann studied might look 
unimportant if judged by IR theoretical assumptions, but they actually had the potential to 
challenge and transform the very categories on which IR theory was based (for microanalyses 
that follow the spirit of Neumann’s early intervention, see Schindler 2014; Braun et al. 2019). 
 
Microanalysis is a useful tool for thinking critically about theory as ideology. I use the term 
‘ideology critique’ here with the meaning of demonstrating that a certain kind of (theoretical) 
knowledge is false yet nonetheless productive.ii Microanalysis can show that there is, on the 
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one hand, something false and delusional about theory; its claims of validity are more 
contested and less certain than assumed. On the other hand, microanalysis shows that theory 
is performative and productive of reality. Microanalysis achieves this double aim by zooming 
in on the fact that theoretical claims are constitutive of concrete social practices and 
situations. Theories are the thinking tools not only of academics, but also of ‘lay’ participants 
in social life. In this chapter, I introduce four concrete strategies that use the examination of 
‘lay’ theories for the purposes of ideology critique. I take these strategies from an in-depth 
discussion four seminal interventions in different disciplines – one authored by a sociologist 
(Donald MacKenzie), two by anthropologists (Marshall Sahlins and Lila Abu-Lughod), and 
one by a historian (Paul Schroeder). All four interventions demonstrate that a focus on 
seemingly small and unimportant details is able to speak in a critical manner to broad and 
general theoretical questions – neither by underwriting abstract hypotheses, nor by theorizing 
an alternative to them, but by raising direct questions about the uses, limits, and effects of 
macro-theory. In each text, macro-theory is itself a direct object of critique, and a distinct 
feature of macro-theory is subjected to critical attention: its translations into practice 
(MacKenzie), its cultural limitations (Sahlins), its conceptual inadequacies (Abu-Lughod), 
and finally its problematic effects (Schroeder). In sum, what is gained through this discussion 
is a view on four viable strategies of critique that can add in a useful manner to the repertoire 
of micro-moves in IR today. The subsequent sections of the chapter introduce these four 
strategies one after the other; the first section begins with an exploration of the general and 
basic condition that enables the use of microanalysis as ideology critique – the so-called 
‘double hermeneutic’. 
 
1. Criticizing translations of theory 
Anthony Giddens’ classic The Constitution of Society begins with a reflection on the distinct 
characteristics of the social sciences. Giddens makes a strong case for seeing the enterprise of 
social science as different from (classical) natural science. The key difference, Giddens 
argues, is that the objects of social science are themselves subjects who interpret and explain 
what they and others do. There is, in other words, a ‘double hermeneutic’: ‘a mutual 
interpretative interplay between social science and those whose activities compose its subject 
matter’ (Giddens 1984, xxxii). In social science, the boundary between scientific observer and 
observed phenomena is not usefully conceptualized as one between subject and object.iii  The 
subject matter of social science is itself composed of reflexive agents with interpretations and 
thoughts. Interpreting and thinking about what these agents do in this sense doubles what the 
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agents themselves already do (cf. also Adorno 1997). This is why Giddens criticizes an 
objectivist understanding of social science that he ascribes to, for instance, Talcott Parsons. 
 
If there is a double hermeneutic, then academic concepts and ideas are not fully separated 
from ‘lay’ concepts and ideas. In fact, Giddens argues that ‘reflections on social processes 
(theories, and observations about them) continually enter into, become disentangled with and 
re-enter the universe of events that they describe’ (Giddens 1984, xxxiii). Social science has 
an influence on – and is itself transformed by – the subject matter it studies. In more recent 
research, this specific phenomenon has been captured with the expression ‘performativity of 
theory’. For instance, in his celebrated An Engine, Not a Camera, economic sociologist 
Donald MacKenzie (2006) demonstrates how theories of financial markets that were 
originally developed in university departments came to have an influence on trading practices 
in these very markets. The theories transformed the world they claimed to explain, because 
the inhabitants of this world themselves began to use the theories to orient their own actions. 
This performative effect either made the predictions of the theories more adequate, since 
social actors began to act precisely in the manner that theoretical assumptions expected of 
them, or it had the adverse consequence of making the theories less adequate, since agents 
began to attempt to trick the theory, for instance by using it to predict the decisions of other 
traders and then preventing these decisions from becoming effective. For the latter case, 
MacKenzie speaks of ‘counter-performativity’, an effect that made the academic theories less 
useful and ultimately led to further theoretical innovation. 
 
One implication of the double hermeneutic is that the tracing of how academic concepts 
travel into practice (and vice versa) yields considerable potential. In IR, such tracing is 
undertaken for instance in studies of the ‘translations’ between science and practice (Berger 
and Esguerra 2018; Schindler 2018) or of the ‘trading zones’ between academic and 
international practices (Holthaus and Steffek, this volume). The examination of these 
translations is a critical enterprise in that it demonstrates the performative effects of analytical 
constructs, or shows how these constructs stem from specific societal concerns and ideas and 
are thus historically contingent. The study of translations is, however, not the only way in 
which the double hermeneutic allows for critical studies of theory as ideology. By pointing 
out alternative perspectives on the social that are ignored by the most widespread forms of 




2. Criticizing the cultural limitations of theory 
The enterprise of studying other forms of making sense of the world is associated notably 
with the study of other ‘cultures’, other social contexts in which different cultural categories 
order the world and interpret actions and events. One example can be found in the work of 
historical anthropologist Marshall Sahlins. The central topic of Sahlins’s research is the 
history of Polynesian islands in the Pacific Ocean. In many writings and books, Sahlins has 
developed a deep, ethnographic understanding of this history – an understanding of 
Polynesian culture, and of how it was transformed through the encounter with European 
discoverers and colonizers. In one much cited essay, entitled Other Times, other Customs: 
The Anthropology of History Sahlins (1985, ch. 2) shows that Polynesian peoples had their 
own sense, their own theory, of this encounter with the Europeans.  
 
Sahlins’s essay focuses on a Maori uprising in New Zealand, during which a Maori chief, of 
the name Hone Heke, resisted British colonization. Hone Heke and his warriors’ resistance 
against the British was not primarily directed against British settlements and fortresses. 
Instead, it was directed in particular against a British flagpole, a pole that the British had 
erected somewhere on the coast, with the Union Jack on it. Hone Heke and the Maori rebels 
tried, time and again and with considerable success, to cut down this flagpole – and, to quote 
Sahlins: ‘Heke’s persistence in downing it was matched only by the British insistence on 
resurrecting it’ (1985, 60). How can one make sense of this fight against a flagpole? Had the 
Maoris understood that it symbolized, for the British, their sovereignty over the land? In a 
sense, they had understood it, but as Sahlins shows, in a sense quite different than the British. 
The flagpole had a meaning within the concepts of Maori culture, and in particular within a 
Maori and Polynesian theory of history. For the Maori rebels, the fight against the flagpole 
reproduced a fight that had been going on for many generations, and actually, since the 
creation of the world, when the God of the Heaven penetrated Earth and thus created life. The 
flagpole symbolized, or rather was, a penetration of the Earth, a seizure of the land – and 
indeed the Maori rebels were much more interested in downing the pole than in getting the 
flag.  
 
The specific practices of the Maori rebellion against the British become intelligible only 
within this Maori theory of history, a theory that explains and links together many past 
historical events – including the creation of the world, the first landing of the Maori on New 
Zealand (when, according to myths, a pole was erected), as well as many subsequent battles 
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in which the erection of poles again played a crucial role. The theory made possible a 
reproduction of these past events in present action, in the fight against the British 
colonization. The encounter between European colonizers and Polynesian people is an 
encounter between two different cosmologies, two different ways of sorting the world and 
theorizing what goes on within it. Crucially, Sahlins argues that an adequate understanding of 
the Maori cultural consciousness can make us more aware of the limitations of our own. By 
understanding how other people theorize the world, we can better understand that also our 
own theories are culturally and historically formed. He argues: 
 
‘Capitalist society does have a distinctive mode of appearance, therefore a definite 
anthropological consciousness, pervasive also in the theoretical dispositions of the 
Academy. The native theory is that social outcomes are the cumulative expression of 
individual actions [...] The impression is given that the whole culture is organized by 
people’s businesslike economizing. This impression is doubled by the democratic 
political process in which Everyman counts as ‘one’ (vote), so representing the 
governing powers as ‘the people’s cherce.’ The prevailing quantitative, populist, and 
materialist presuppositions of our social science can then be no accident – or there is 
no anthropology.’ (Sahlins 1985, 52) 
 
The presuppositions of social science are, Sahlins argues, ‘no accident’. They are derived 
from and play a role in a specific cultural consciousness – the capitalist, individualist 
consciousness of our own time. This critical, reflexive awareness is created through a ‘micro-
move’, through Sahlins’s in-depth grasp of highly specific acts, such as the setting up – and 
the cutting down – of a flagpole in New Zealand in the 18th century. By revealing that the 
erection of this flagpole doesn’t simply mean a taking possession of the land according to 
rituals of European rules of sovereignty, and that the Maori are not fighting the Union Jack 
but rather the pole itself, Sahlins creates an awareness that inter-cultural encounters are not 
simply about different but compatible interpretations of the same world, but that instead two 
quite different ways of theorizing the world are in disagreement, and that the same acts thus 
are explainable in quite different terms, with different consequences. 
 
3. Criticizing conceptual inadequacies of theories 
In 1990, the anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod published an essay on ‘The Romance of 
Resistance’ in the American Ethnologist. The starting point of this essay is the observation 
that the relationship between power and resistance had become a central concern in the 
 
8 
human sciences, and that there was a tendency in many studies to celebrate resistance – a 
certain ‘romance of resistance’, in Abu-Lughod’s words. Her essay shows that the conceptual 
distinction on which this attempt was based – the one between power and resistance – is 
difficult to establish when one begins to understand the perspectives of participants in social 
situations. Abu-Lughod’s case is the role of women in a Bedouin society in Northern Egypt, 
between Alexandria and the Libyan border. 
 
Abu-Lughod at first points out that the traditional Bedouin, patriarchal society leaves spaces 
for resistance by women. While men officially have certain decision-making powers, such as 
the decision on whom to marry their daughters to, this does not mean that no resistance is 
possible. Resistance takes the form of songs, poetry, and jokes, in which certain male 
attributes are ridiculed. It takes also more active forms, such as direct interventions by 
mothers and aunts, or daughters who appear to get crazy as the marriage date approaches, 
thus preventing the marriage from taking effect. Abu-Lughod concludes that this situation 
poses certain ‘analytic dilemmas’ (1990, 47). Notably, it implies that several analytical 
categories are difficult to apply. Thus, one cannot attribute a feminist consciousness to these 
women, since theirs is clearly not a struggle for emancipation, but it is equally inappropriate 
to simply treat their practices as ‘prepolitical, primitive, or even misguided’ (Abu-Lughod 
1990, 47). The Bedouin women both support and resist the extant system of power; they 
accept for instance the practice of veiling, but they do not unquestioningly accept male 
power. In this situation, analytical concepts such as ‘false consciousness, which dismisses 
their own understanding of their situation’ or ‘impression management, which makes them 
cynical manipulators’, are misleading, since they cannot grasp the simultaneous presence of 
resistance to, and support for, existing power hierarchies (Abu-Lughod 1990, 47). 
 
The situation has become even more complicated with the entry of modern (Westernized) 
Egyptian society and values into the Bedouin context. These values imply a certain form of 
liberation for the Bedouin women, but they also bring with them new forms of domination. In 
particular, they threaten the bases of the forms of resistance just described, namely intra-
gender support and in general the strong intra-gender ties among the women. Abu-Lughod 
illustrates this development through an examination of how marriage practices change, and in 
particular by analyzing the role of a ‘deceptively frivolous issue: lingerie’ (1990, 49). By 
buying lingerie for their weddings, younger women achieve a degree of freedom from their 
traditional role and from the control of elder women. Traditionally, marriage rituals stage a 
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‘dramatic contest between kin groups and between men and women’ (Abu-Lughod 1990, 51). 
They bring not only two individuals into a relationship, but they also create ties between 
groups demarcated by kin and gender, and that they do so is symbolized through staged 
contests between these groups. It is these ties that come under pressure through a different 
(Western) set of marriage practices that emphasize the uniqueness of the relationship between 
man and women. And, as Abu-Lughod points out: 
 
‘In resisting the axes of kin and gender, the young women who want the lingerie, 
Egyptian songs, satin wedding dresses, and fantasies of private romance their elders 
resist are perhaps unwittingly enmeshing themselves in an extraordinarily complex 
set of new power relations.’ (Abu-Lughod 1990, 52). 
 
Through their resistance against traditional society, the young women are not simply 
liberating themselves, but entering a new set of power relations. They are now bound to the 
Egyptian economy and to the Egyptian state, ‘many of whose powers depend on separating 
kin groups and regulating individuals’ (Abu-Lughod 1990, 52). And here, the elder women’s 
attempt to ridicule their youngers’ lingerie becomes itself a form of resistance: resistance 
against the Egyptian economy and state and its attempts to control individuals. 
 
By looking closely into how resistance unfolds in a social situation, Abu-Lughod becomes 
aware that certain analytical distinctions are less clear than they may appear at first sight. As 
she concludes, ‘if systems of power are multiple, then resisting at one level may catch people 
up at other levels’ (Abu-Lughod 1990, 53). Power and resistance cannot be clearly separated 
on a theoretical basis. The very acts that allow the young Bedouin women to emancipate 
themselves from the traditional ties to elder generations are simultaneously acts that immerse 
them in new relations of power, relations that, in turn, the elder women resist.  
 
4. Criticizing problematic effects of theories 
The historian Paul W. Schroeder is widely credited for having achieved a fundamental 
transformation of our view of European politics before and after the Congress of Vienna in 
1814. In his monumental study The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, 
Schroeder (1994) corrects a widespread misinterpretation of the ‘European Concert’ of Great 
Powers established at Vienna. The Concert period was – and still is – often associated with 
the notion of a balance-of-power. This association is not as such false: The term was used by 
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statesmen (they were basically all men) at the time of the Congress. However, the term does 
not imply that the practice of the Concert was predominantly one of balancing power, in the 
sense that state leaders were preoccupied with maximizing their own power in order to keep 
the power of other actors in check. Quite on the contrary, the Congress period was, as 
Schroeder shows, marked by a crucial departure from an earlier concept of balance-of-power 
according to which balancing power meant little else than furthering one’s own interests.  
 
Schroeder argues that leaders and diplomats in the 18th century had a tremendously 
destructive understanding of inter-state politics. To achieve a balance meant, for them, only to 
maximize their own share of the cake. This understanding led, for instance, to various 
partitions of states, such as the divisions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. Whenever one 
actor gained, the others sought ‘compensations’ for themselves, so that – allegedly – the 
balance was kept. The result was a period of unceasing conflict and war: ‘Balance-of-power 
rules and practices were not a solution to war in the eighteenth century (if they ever have 
been) but a major part of the problem’ (Schroeder 1994, 6). In order to overcome the 
condition of a nearly permanent threat of violent conflict, state leaders had to overcome their 
misguided theoretical understanding of the balance-of-power. Schroeder argues that this is 
precisely what they learned at Vienna. 
 
Schroeder explicitly treats the 18th century balance-of-power doctrine as a ‘belief system, an 
ideology’ (Schroeder 1994, 9). He is critical of a specific understanding this concept as it 
manifested itself in historical practices before the Congress of Vienna. The main thrust of 
Schroeder’s book is a detailed reconstruction, written in the style of classical diplomatic 
history, of who made a specific decision when and where, and for what reasons. Schroeder 
zooms in on event after event, war after war, battle after battle, from 1763, the end of the 
Seven Years War, to 1848. But Schroeder does so for a critical purpose. His argument is that 
decision-makers before 1814 lacked a conception of a durable peace. To structure and orient 
their relations to each other, they only had the notion of balance-of-power, which endured not 
only because of its ‘surface plausibility and consistency’ or its political advantages 
(Schroeder 1994, 10). Rather, Schroeder asserts, ‘the chief attractive power of this balance-of-
power doctrine, then as now, was its apparent inescapability, the absence of a practical 
alternative’ (Schroeder 1994, 10). What Schroeder’s study of a tremendous amount of 
specific political actions and decisions – his book is 894 pages long – shows, is that the 
balance-of-power doctrine worked as an ideology precisely in the sense Robert Cox has 
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described it: a theory that concealed its own standpoint in space and time (Cox 1981, 128). 
The doctrine made to appear something as natural and inevitable that was, in fact, not without 
alternatives.  
 
Among IR theories, the concept of balance-of-power is often associated with the theories of 
realism and neo-realism. While the claim that the pursuit of power is rooted in human nature 
is indeed sometimes associated with classical realist thinkers, this does not imply that they 
understood the balance-of-power doctrine precisely as state leaders understood it in the 18th 
century. Still, there are textbook versions of realism that narrow it down to claims about the 
inevitability and permanency of the struggle for power and the resulting need to further one’s 
own power in turn. Moreover, the neorealist Kenneth Waltz in particular has emphasized the 
inevitability of the pursuit of self-interest in an anarchical political system – not because of 
human nature, but because of systemic conditions. As Waltz emphasizes, ‘self-help is 
necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order’ (1979: 111). Schroeder’s study 
demonstrates the enormously destructive consequences of such a theoretical claim if it 
becomes an ideological belief held by political decision-makers. Take, as an example, 
Schroeder’s analysis of the Austrian leadership’s choice to abandon its ‘longstanding 
principle of preserving Poland’ (Schroeder 1994, 146). As Schroeder analyzes it, Austrian 
reasoning was guided by the idea that this measure would serve Austria best in securing its 
own existence and power – in other words, it would be its best strategy for ‘helping itself’: it 
would enhance its relative position vis-à-vis Prussia and Russia, by securing the acquisition 
of territory for Austria in Southern Poland and by bringing Prussia and Russia into an 
agonistic relationship. These aims exemplify, writes Schroeder, ‘how balance-of-power 
thinking escalates conflicts’ (Schroeder 1994, 147). Moving to the micro-level and analyzing 
in-depth specific justifications for a decision, Schroeder mounts a critical challenge to a 
specific theoretical idea, namely that in international politics, only the seeking of 
‘compensations’ (self-help) will lead to survival and success. On the contrary, Schroeder 
argues, this theoretical idea leads not to survival, but to destruction. 
 
The ideological character of the balance-of-power doctrine becomes apparent in particular 
through Schroeder’s analysis of the transformation that was achieved in 1814. Schroeder 
claims that, through trial and error, and through the experience of enormous destruction, 
European political elites learned to value the existence of an international order in its own 
right. They ‘managed to concentrate on creating a political coalition for the purpose of 
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durable peace rather than victory’ (Schroeder 1994, 581). The peace that followed the 
Congress of Vienna – a peace, it should be noted, that primarily concerned the relations 
between European sovereigns but ignored relations between them and their peoples and 
between them and extra-European polities – was neither the result of ‘favourable 
circumstance, war-weariness, ideological uniformity, or other contingent factors’ (Schroeder 
1994, 577-8). Instead, it ‘came by effort and design” and resulted from “consciously 
confronting structural problems and conflicts’ (Schroeder 1994, 578). European decision-
makers learned that peace required both action and effort, that it required the deliberate 
choice to focus on how to stabilize relations rather than pursue only one’s victory – they 
learned, after all, what peace is, and that peace cannot exist as long as there is belief in the 
theoretical principle that everyone needs to help themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed how microanalysis – by ‘zooming in’ on the details of 
specific social situations – can deliver a challenge to extant theoretical categories and 
assumptions. It can do so in at least four ways. First, it can show how theoretical models 
travel into practice, where they are used by practitioners to shape and change the world that is 
explained by the models. Second, it can create awareness about the cultural specificity of 
theoretical concepts by pointing out how the same events can be interpreted quite differently 
if different cultural categories are applied. Third, it can demonstrate that certain analytical 
distinctions or concepts deliver inadequate impressions of the complexity of social action. 
Finally, it can reveal concrete problematic political effects of specific theoretical assumptions. 
 
The motivation for this intervention is to encourage those scholars who are interested in the 
details of social situations – in the detailed unfolding of very specific happenings and events – 
to think about how their own research relates to certain broader, more general assumptions, 
ideas or hypotheses that are held in streams of social science. The study of politics engages 
with a matter that is difficult to predict or fashion into boxes. From the viewpoint of Hannah 
Arendt (1958), politics deals with the unpredictable as such; one cannot predict what happens 
when people act in common, since in their acting they appear in their uniqueness. This 
appearance is, for Arendt, the very purpose of political action, and it may be one reason why 
theories must fail to predict what will happen in the future. Events make their own theories – 
this is a view that Marshall Sahlins would also subscribe to, and we have witnessed the 
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phenomenon in IR, where social constructivism took a specific turn and gained influence only 
when the Cold War ended. 
 
The point here is that we need to better understand what theoretical assumptions do in the 
world they aspire to explain. Given the inevitable double hermeneutic of social science, there 
is no way to isolate practice from (social) science. Practitioners think about what they do and 
interpret their own and others’ behavior. This is, of course, no new insight. However, IR 
would much benefit from studies that inquire into the practical and political role of certain 
basic ideas that are widely held to be ‘merely’ or ‘purely’ theoretical (Schindler 2014). Most 
fundamentally, this has implications for macro theory’s claim to be able to identify the main 
driving forces of international history, a claim that Kenneth Waltz indeed formulated in his 
famous book Theory of International Politics which still yields considerable influence in the 
discipline, if not for its contents then for its style of theorizing. Waltz describes abstraction – 
the moving away from reality – as the fundamental task of theory, and he attempts to identify 
propelling principles and driving forces that are invisible to the ‘naked eye’ (Waltz 1979, 10). 
But this very attempt stands in an uncanny relationship to the conspiracy theories that 
proliferate today, which are equally based on the premise that the conspiratorial forces they 
identify are invisible to the naked eye, but nonetheless enormously powerful (Fluck 2016; 
Aistrope and Bleiker 2018). Understanding this kind of macro-theory which claims to know 
forces that nobody can see or perceive with her own senses, but that allegedly has enormous 
‘explanatory power’ (Waltz 1979, 7), is a pressing political concern today. 
 
We need to understand the historical origins and the political uses of specific theories. We 
need to make theories the subject matter of our studies, in order to understand how they 
impact the world when people begin to use their assumptions and operations. This does not 
imply a renunciation of our own engagement in theory. The implication of this specific 
‘micro-move’ is, rather, that theorizing is a continuous task and that this task is not conducted 
in an ivory tower. The link to practice is not only that theorists educate students, the link is 
also that we – academic theorists – gain our insights by reflecting on experiences we share 
with others who equally live in this world. No wonder, then, that we can use an analysis of 
the structures of our own thinking for a diagnostic of the world. It is R.B.J. Walker who 
famously argued that IR theories may be more interesting as ‘phenomena to be explained than 
as explanations’ (Walker 1993, 6). Walker himself never considered studying everyday 
practices and ‘lay’ theories to achieve this goal, but this is the promise Neumann clearly 
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recognized – a promise that is, it seems to me, still largely unfulfilled when it comes to the 
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